

Implementing the EU Cyber Resilience Act: Workstreams and Key Outcomes



LF Member Summit
19 November 2024
Mirko Boehm

The CRA: An introduction

EU Cyber Resilience Act

The EU acts to strengthen the approach to cybersecurity regulation at union level.

The CRA aims to achieve 3 policy goals:

- To **reduce vulnerabilities** in digital products,
- To ensure cybersecurity is **maintained** throughout a **product's life cycle** and
- To **enable users** to **make informed decisions** when selecting and operating digital products

The CRA establishes **horizontal mandatory cyber-security requirements** for all digital products (software and/or hardware).

The EU intends to play a **leading international role** in cybersecurity regulation.

Manufacturers and OSS stewards

Manufacturer:
full range of obligations

...means any natural or legal person who develops or manufactures **products with digital elements** or has products with digital elements designed, developed or manufactured, **and markets them** under his or her name or trademark, whether for payment, monetisation or free of charge

Open source software steward:
light-touch regulatory regime

...means any legal person, **other than a manufacturer**, which has the purpose or objective to **systematically provide support** on a sustained basis for the development of specific products with digital elements qualifying as **free and open-source software** that are intended for commercial activities, and **ensures the viability** of those products

Highlights of key concepts

- **Product with digital elements (PDE)**: means a **software or hardware product** and its remote data processing solutions, including software or hardware components being placed on the market separately
- **Substantial modifications** means a change to the product with digital elements following its placing on the market, which affects the compliance of the product with digital elements
- **CE marking** means a marking by which a **manufacturer** indicates that a product with digital elements and the processes put in place by the manufacturer are in conformity... (stewards cannot apply CE marks)
- **Free and open-source software** means software the source code of which is openly shared and which is made available under a free and open-source licence which provides for all rights to make it freely **accessible, usable, modifiable and redistributable**

Process obligations for manufacturers

- Perform cybersecurity risk assessment covering the whole product life cycle
- Perform due diligence when integrating 3rd party or open source software into your PDE
- Report identified vulnerabilities back to upstream vendors/stewards, ideally in machine readable format
- Provide security updates for 5 years (or longer) and keep them available for 10 years (or longer)
- Manufacturers should draw up SBOMs but are not required to make them available to the general public
- Provide documentation to consumers about the risk assessment and conformity, in clear, understandable language for 10 years or more
- Apply the CE mark to demonstrate conformity
- Make PDE clearly identifiable
- Provide a single point of contact for cybersecurity inquiries
- Demonstrate conformity at the request of market surveillance authorities
- Communicate the ceasing of operations in the EU market to market surveillance authorities

Reporting obligations for manufacturers

- Manufacturers should **notify** actively exploited **vulnerabilities**
- ... as well as severe **incidents**
- via a single reporting platform to a national CSIRT of their choice and ENISA
- Information to be shared in an European **vulnerability database**
- Vulnerabilities discovered in good faith (intrusion tests, review) do not need to be reported
- Manufacturers may apply for **brief delays**, e.g. if a fix is forthcoming
- Manufacturers should establish a vulnerability disclosure policy for **reporting** and **inquiry** by consumers
- Report actively exploited vulnerabilities
 - with an early warning within 24h of identification
 - with a full notification within 72h
 - following up with a final report within 14 days
- Report severe incidents
 - with an early warning within 24h of identification
 - with a full notification within 72h
 - following up with a final report within 1 month
- On an actively exploited vulnerability or severe incident ...
 - inform the affected users of the PDE
 - provide guidance on risk mitigation and corrective measures to users

Obligations for stewards

- Put in place and document a **cybersecurity policy** to foster the development of a secure product and effective handling of vulnerabilities
- **Cooperate with MSA** on the mitigation of vulnerabilities on their request
- Be prepared **handle MSA requests** to the project/community timely and diligently
- Participate in **voluntary cybersecurity attestation programmes**

Notable: Stewards have **no obligations towards manufacturers!**

Individual developers and upstream contributions

- **Individual developers** (hobbyists, occasional contributors, as long as participation remains non-commercial) are **exempt**
- **Contributing to projects** where you don't have responsibility is **exempt** (the upstream project takes responsibility)
- **Individual** developers may be **manufacturers** (e.g., one-person businesses) ~~or **stewards** (e.g., long term maintainers)~~
- Be aware: Projects **grow** from ideas to large communities or businesses - hobbyists and small communities may **become** manufacturers or stewards

Cybersecurity state of the art and
the implementation gap to the CRA

What if the CRA is an **opportunity** for OSS?

As the **largest global open source foundation**, the Linux Foundation already is a successful **steward for open source projects**.

- The regulatory push for more refined cyber security practises provides us with an opportunity to **shape community processes**:
 - New/updated supply chain management guidelines
 - Data formats and tooling
 - Project management and governance
- Timeframe: CRA implementation period (now...2027)

The LF aims to be the best Open Source Software Steward on the planet!

Leading by example: Yocto, Zephyr, CIP, ...

- Many LF projects already have a strong cybersecurity posture
- The CRA codifies many practises the community has called for for some time
 - Long-term security updates for products
 - Better transparency about vulnerabilities and mitigation
 - Separate, free-of-charge security updates
 - ...
- Need: Compare cybersecurity best-practices in open source projects and identify the delta to the CRA

yocto .
PROJECT



Implementation workstreams

CRA implementation: Work streams

Consider: The CRA is an **EU market regulation** - it affects **all** open source projects and manufacturers active there!

- **Formalize community specifications**: Elevate existing cybersecurity best practises and guidelines to formal specifications, e.g. through PAS (**JDF/OpenSSF**)
- **Provide community guidance**: Create awareness of the required changes through research, whitepapers, training (**LF Research, LF Education**)
- **Processes and tooling**: Deploy processes and tooling across the LF project portfolio and to manufacturers to support CRA obligations (**OpenChain, SPDX, LFX, ...**)

Challenges

- Diverse LF project portfolio, strong autonomy of the projects WRT their development practises
- Manufacturers wish for unified processes, however open source ecosystem is diverse, decentralized
- Horizontal collaboration between various open source organisations difficult so far
- Difficult choice for LF as the largest foundation: Bear the cost to the benefit of the whole ecosystem, or have others co-opt our efforts

Community/maintainer relationship

- The upstream project hosts open source projects under neutral governance
- Maintainers form the TSC usually as an additional role in their day job
- Contributors usually work downstream or in service businesses
- Remember: [Open Source Maintainers Owe You Nothing](#)



Photo by [Daniel Funes Fuentes](#) on [Unsplash](#)

Collaborative lifecycle support

- The best way to ensure the viability of an open source dependency is to participate in the governance of the project
- Through participation in governance, members gain influence on the long-term project roadmap and the contribution process
- By identifying their essential dependencies and engaging with their stewards, manufacturers are able to ensure maintenance throughout the required support period





Photo by [Jakub Pabis](#) on [Unsplash](#)

Workstream: Formalize community specifications

- Community specifications or guidelines need to be formalized into standards so that they can be adopted for CRA compliance
- **Leading example: OpenChain**
 - OpenChain ISO/IEC 5230: The international standard for open source license compliance programs
 - OpenChain ISO/IEC 18974: The industry standard for open source security assurance programs
- Next: OpenSSF best practices, score card,



Related LF projects: OpenChain, OpenSSF, Joint Development Foundation

Workstream: Provide community guidance

- Aligning cybersecurity across the ecosystem depends a lot on guidance, awareness building and training
- First step: LF Research report on the state of the art of cybersecurity and the gap to the CRA (intended to be published in January 2025)
- To be decided: training program, educational materials, best practises guidelines (e.g., [Certified Open Source Developer for Enterprise \(CODE\)](#))



Related LF projects: LF Research, LF Education, TODO Group

Workstream: Processes and tooling

- CRA compliance requires a steward to handle vulnerability reporting, release documentation, ... in a unified and documented manner
- Required: Document formats and profiles, process specifications, tooling and application support across projects



OpenChain, SPDX, LFX, ORT

Related LF projects: OpenChain, SPDX, LFX, ORT



Implications and takeaways

Need for more explicit governance norms

Explicit posture regarding own roles: Do you act as a steward (provision of open source software without introducing products into the market) or a manufacturer (providing commercial products that possibly integrate OSS or proprietary components)

Explicit policies on releases: When is a release made? E.g., are only tagged versions or individual changes to main a released version?

Debates on “does this take into account the historically grown characteristics nature of some open source communities, e.g. the peculiar setup of Debian”? - however: The CRA contains guidance about what regulators think a reasonable setup for a steward should look like. This implicitly says “change your ways, or take responsibility for the consequences”

OSS Stewards and Manufacturers Workshop

Join **OpenSSF and Linux Foundation Europe** for the workshop that **kicks off the LF Europe CRA Implementation SIG**.

- **Collaboratively draft a plan** for cybersecurity standards
- Discuss how Linux Foundation **projects** will adapt operations to **comply with CRA**
- **Gain insights into how the CRA will impact Stewards and Manufacturers** and what changes are required.

Get Involved! For more info, contact:

info@linuxfoundation.eu



**Request your
invitation NOW**

Outlook

- Legislative status: CRA proposed on 15 September 2022 by the European Commission, approved by European Parliament on 12 March 2024, adopted by the European Council on 10 October 2024
- The CRA is the first union-level regulation that models open source software stewards separately from manufacturers
- Many implementation details to be decided during the upcoming development of harmonised standards, Linux Foundation participates as a stakeholder

Timeline

- CRA should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) “any day now”
- Vulnerability reporting obligations become effective after 21 months (Q3/2026?)
- The remaining obligations become effective after 36 months (Q4/2027?)

Thank you!

mirko@linuxfoundation.eu



Manufacturers: Conformity and Penalties



Conformity:

- (Only) the **CE marking** communicates that a product complies with the CRA
- CI is considered part of the **production process** and subject to conformity assessment
- A regulatory sandbox will be developed where dry-run conformity assessments can be performed
- **Accreditation** for conformance assessment bodies to be implemented

Penalties:

“The penalties ... shall be effective, **proportionate** and **dissuasive**”:

- **5..15M€ or 1..2.5% of global turnover** in prior fiscal year, whichever is higher
- Fines should be proportionate, take circumstances into account
- Possible enforcement through “representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers”